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I. INTRODUCTION
According to Rudolf Peierls [1],
[T]he most fundamental statement of quantum me-
chanics is that the wavefunction, or, more generally
the density matrix, represents our knowledge of the
system we are trying to describe.
In answer to the question “Whose knowledge?” Peierls
goes on to say:
[Density matrices] may differ, as the nature and
amount of knowledge may differ. People may have
observed the system by different methods, with more
or less accuracy; they may have seen part of the re-
sults of another physicist. However, there are limi-
tations to the extent to which their knowledge may
differ. This is imposed by the uncertainty princi-
ple. For example if one observer has knowledge of
Sz of our Stern-Gerlach atom, another may not know
Sx, since measurement of Sx would have destroyed
the other person’s knowledge of Sz, and vice versa.
This limitation can be compactly and conveniently
expressed by the condition that the density matrices
used by the two observers must commute with each
other.
In another essay to which he refers the reader of [1] Peierls
adds a corollary to his first condition [2]:
At the same time, the two observers should not con-
tradict each other. This means the product of the
two density matrices should not be zero.
In discussing the extent to which density matrices as-
signed by observers with differing knowledge may differ,
it is useful to define a set of density matrices to be com-
patible when there could be circumstances under which
they would represent the knowledge different people have
of one and the same physical system.
Christopher Fuchs [3] has pointed out a simple coun-
terexample to Peierls’ first compatibility condition, that
density matrices used by two different observers must
necessarily commute, but one of us has argued [4] that
Peierls’ second compatibility condition remains a neces-
sary constraint. The critique of Peierls’ conditions in [4]
leaves open, however, the question of what might consti-
tute necessary and sufficient conditions for several den-
sity matrices to be mutually compatible. Here we provide
an answer for systems described by a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space.
In Section II we show that if each of several different
density matrices has a (not necessarily unique) expansion
(in not necessarily orthogonal states) of the form
ρ =
∑
i
pi|φi〉〈φi|, pi > 0, (1)
and there is at least one state common to every one of
the expansions, then there are circumstances under which
those density matrices can represent the different knowl-
edge available to different people about one and the same
physical system.
In Section III we argue that if different density matrices
do represent the knowledge available to different people
about one and the same physical system, then the sup-
ports of all of those density matrices must have at least
one state in common. (The support S(ρ) of a density
matrix ρ is the subspace spanned by all its eigenvectors
with non-zero eigenvalues.)
In Section IV we show that the supports of several
different density matrices have at least one state in com-
mon if and (for a finite dimensional Hilbert space) only
if each has an expansion of the form (1) with at least one
state common to all the expansions. Together with the
results of Sections II and III, this shows that several den-
sity matrices are mutually compatible if and only if the
supports of all them have at least one state in common,
or equivalently, if and only if all of them have expansions
of the form (1) with at least one state common to all
expansions.
In Section V we comment on these results.
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II. A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
COMPATIBILITY
Let ρa and ρb be two [5] different assignments of density
matrix to one and the same system S. Let them have
expansions (1) that share a common state |φ〉:
ρa = pa|φ〉〈φ| +
∑
i≥1
pai|φai〉〈φai|,
ρb = pb|φ〉〈φ| +
∑
i≥1
pbi|φbi〉〈φbi|, (2)
with all p non-negative and pa and pb both greater than
zero. Then there are conditions under which the knowl-
edge Alice and Bob can each have of S can be encapsu-
lated in density matrices ρa and ρb. Here is one way this
can come about:
Let there be two more systems, Sa and Sb. Alice and
Bob both know that the composite system Sa + Sb +
S is in the pure state |Ψ〉 given (to within an overall
normalization constant) by
|Ψ〉 = |a0〉|b0〉|φ〉 +
∑
i≥1
√
pai/pa |a0〉|bi〉|φai〉
+
∑
i≥1
√
pbi/pb |ai〉|b0〉|φbi〉, (3)
where the |an〉 and |bn〉 are orthonormal sets of states for
Sa and Sb. Alice has access only to Sa and Bob only to
Sb. None of them have access to S, which neither they
nor anybody else act upon. Both of them know all of
this.
Alice measures a non-degenerate observable A on Sa
whose eigenstates are |a0〉, |a1〉, |a2〉, . . . and finds the
result associated with |a0〉, while Bob measures an ob-
servable B on Sb, finding the result associated with |b0〉.
This is a possible set of joint outcomes, since the am-
plitude of |a0〉|b0〉|φ〉 is nonzero. Neither knows what, if
anything, may have happened to the subsystems accessi-
ble to the other.
Anybody informed of the results of both measurements
would conclude that the state of S was now |φ〉. But since
Alice does not know the results of Bob’s measurement,
or even whether he undertook to perform any measure-
ments, she can only reason as follows:
Immediately after her measurement she assigns to Sb+
S the state (to within normalization)
|Ψa〉 = |b0〉|φ〉 +
∑
i≥1
√
pai/pa |bi〉|φai〉. (4)
Not knowing what, if anything, Bob may have done to
his own subsystem, Alice assigns to S the reduced den-
sity matrix obtained from |Ψa〉〈Ψa| by taking the partial
trace over Sb. This is precisely ρa.
In the same way, knowing only the results of his own
measurement, Bob will describe S with the reduced den-
sity matrices ρb.
This construction generalizes to any number of ob-
servers. For Alice, Bob, and Carol, for example, one
would have additional subsystems Sa, Sb, and Sc, the
joint state (3) would become
|Ψ〉 = |a0〉|b0〉|c0〉|φ〉+
∑
i≥1
√
pai/pa |a0〉|bi〉|ci〉|φai〉
+
∑
i≥1
√
pbi/pb |ai〉|b0〉|ci〉|φbi〉
+
∑
i≥1
√
pci/pc |ai〉|bi〉|c0〉|φci〉, (5)
and the state (4) Alice assigns to the other subsystems
after she measures her own to be in the state |a0〉 would
become
|Ψa〉 = |b0〉|c0〉|φ〉 +
∑
i≥1
√
pai/pa |bi〉|ci〉|φai〉, (6)
which again leads her, in the absence of any knowledge
of what Bob and Carol may or may not have done, to
assign the reduced density matrix ρa to the system S.
III. A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR
COMPATIBILITY
Suppose Alice, Bob, Carol, . . . describe a system with
density matrices ρa, ρb, ρc, . . . . Each of their different
density matrix assignments incorporates some subset of
a valid body of currently relevant information about the
system, all of which could, in principle, be known by a
particularly well-informed Zeno [6].
Let us say that a system is found to be in a particu-
lar pure state if the projection operator on that state is
measured and the result is 1. We then refer to that state
as the outcome of the measurement [7]. The set of all
states that a density matrix ρ forbids to be outcomes of
a measurement is called the null space of ρ. It is the sub-
space of all eigenvectors of ρ with zero eigenvalue, and
the orthogonal complement of the support S(ρ).
A necessary condition for the compatibility of these
differing density matrix assignments follows from these
considerations:
(i) If anybody describes a system with a density ma-
trix ρ, then nobody can find it to be in a pure state in
the null space of ρ. For although anyone can get a mea-
surement outcome that everyone has assigned non-zero
probabilities, nobody can get an outcome that anybody
knows to be impossible.
2
(ii) A system that cannot be found to be in either of
two distinct states cannot be found to be in any superpo-
sition of those states. For any density matrix whatever
[8] that incorporates the information that both outcomes
are impossible, must also assign zero probability to any
superposition of those outcomes.
(iii) There must be some states in which a system can
be found.
It follows from (i) and (ii) that when different peo-
ple assign different density matrices to one and the same
physical system, the union of all their different null spaces
must span a subspace S0 of states in which the system
cannot be found. According to (iii) there must then be
states |ψ〉 that are not in S0. The projection of such a
|ψ〉 on the orthogonal complement of S0 lies in the sup-
port of every one of the different density matrices. So
for a collection of different state assignments to be com-
patible, the supports of all the different density matrices
must have at least one state in common.
IV. EITHER CONDITION IS NECESSARY AND
SUFFICIENT.
If the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, then the sup-
ports S(ρa), S(ρb), . . . of several different density matri-
ces ρa, ρb, . . . can have at least one state in common if
and only if each has an expansion of the form (1) with at
least one state common to all the expansions. To show
this, we must show that a state |ψ〉 can appear as one of
the |φi〉 in an expansion (1) of a density matrix ρ into not
necessarily orthogonal states if and only if |ψ〉 belongs to
the support of ρ [9].
That any |ψ〉 occurring in (1) must be in the support
of ρ follows directly from the fact that every |φi〉 in (1)
must be orthogonal to any vector |λ〉 in the null space of
ρ, since
〈λ|ρ|λ〉 = 0 (7)
and every pi in (1) is strictly greater than 0.
Conversely, to see that any vector in S(ρ) can appear
in some expansion of the form (1), consider an expansion
of ρ in orthonormal projections onto its eigenvectors,
ρ =
∑
i
ri|ψi〉〈ψi|. (8)
The positive ri in (8) are all bounded away from 0 if the
dimension of S(ρ) is finite. (This is the only place where
we appeal to the finite dimensionality of the Hilbert
space.) Let r0 be the least value of any of the ri and
define non-negative si by
si = ri − r0. (9)
Then
ρ =
∑
i
si|ψi〉〈ψi|+ r0P (10)
where the sum is over the non-zero si and P is the pro-
jection operator onto S(ρ). If |ψ〉 is any unit vector in
S(ρ), then one can find an orthonormal basis |ηi〉 for S(ρ)
with |η0〉 = |ψ〉. Since
P =
∑
i
|ηi〉〈ηi|, (11)
(11) and (10) do indeed give a decomposition of ρ in
which |ψ〉 appears,
ρ = r0|ψ〉〈ψ| +
∑
i>0
r0|ηi〉〈ηi|+
∑
i
si|ψi〉〈ψi|. (12)
V. DISCUSSION
1. The density matrix for a pure state has the one-
dimensional space spanned by that state alone as its
support. So a special case of our condition is that two
pure-state density matrices are compatible if and only
if they are identical. This includes the example given
by Peierls in the first quotation above, but it provides
a rather different explanation. Peierls would say that
the reason Alice can’t know that a spin-1/2 particle is
up along z while Bob knows at the same time that it
is up along x is that the process by which one of them
acquires his or her knowledge necessarily renders obso-
lete the knowledge of the other. From our perspective,
however, the question of how the knowledge might have
been acquired doesn’t enter, provided nothing has been
done that renders the knowledge of either invalid. The
two state assignments are incompatible because if Alice
knew that nobody could find the particle to be down
along z, and Bob knew that nobody could find it to be
down along x, then since | ↓z〉 and | ↓x〉 span the whole
space, the impossibility of superpositions of impossible
outcomes would require all outcomes to be impossible.
2. One could argue that nobody can ever know with
certainty that any outcome of any measurement is strictly
impossible. The support of any realistic density matrix
would then be the entire Hilbert space, and our condition
would be vacuous — any set of density matrices would be
mutually compatible, though the probability of an out-
come leading to such state assignments in the manner
of Section II could be minuscule. On the other hand, al-
though the quantum theory is famously probabilistic, one
should not lose sight of the fact that the theory is also
capable of deterministic assertions, which strictly pro-
hibit certain measurement outcomes under certain ideal
conditions. It is surely a significant feature of the the-
ory that consideration of impossible outcomes and very
little else leads, without any invocation of “the uncer-
tainty principle” or “maximal information”, to the fact
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that pure-state assignments must be unique, as well as
the more general constraint on mixed-state assignments.
3. We have limited the density matrices under consid-
eration in Sec. III to those based on a currently relevant
subset of a body of information that could, in principle,
all have been acquired by a single observer through mea-
surements on the system S or on other systems correlated
with S in known ways. Were we to expand the set of den-
sity matrices to include guesses, or forms incorporating
data based on badly designed measurements or rendered
obsolete by subsequent measurements, then, of course,
our necessary condition need not apply
4. Peierls’ second condition that the product of two
density matrices be nonzero, is implied by our condition
that their supports have at least one state in common,
but it is weaker because it takes into account only point
(i) of Section III but not point (ii). (It too is subject to
the reservation in point 3 above.)
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